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Motivated by the links between terror and crime and the difficulty in directly detecting
terror activity, this article formulates and solves a resource allocation problem on
overlapping networks to determine if interdiction efforts may be able to take advantage
of these connections. The government, knowing only the general structure and overlap
of the networks, allocates its scarce resources to investigate each terror and criminal
network. There are two stages to the investigation: an initial investigation of all nodes
(i.e., terrorists or criminals) and a secondary investigation of criminals identified during
the initial investigation to determine if they are terrorists. Applying the model to data
derived from a population of terrorists in the United States between 1971–2003 suggests
that the government may be able to exploit the terror connections of crimes that are
relatively uncommon, somewhat easy to detect, and are attractive to terrorists.
Terrorists carry out many activities leading up to an attack—including meetings to plan
the logistics of an operation and surveillance of potential targets—that by their nature are
difficult to detect. While some terrorists may avoid criminal activities for reasons of security
or ideology (O’Neil 2007), there are many reasons why they become involved with crime.
To carry out an attack, terrorists might need to obtain weapons or explosives (Jordan and
Horsburgh 2005). Terrorists obtain false documents and launder money to obscure their
identities (O’Neil 2007). Funds may be raised through legitimate means (Morselli and
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Resource Allocation for Domestic Counterterrorism 619
Giguère 2006) or via drug dealing, petty theft, bank robbery, credit card fraud, or selling
contraband merchandise (O’Neil 2007; Jordan and Horsburgh 2005; Morselli, Giguère, and
Petit 2007; Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts 2006). The perceived recent increase in the
overlap between terror and crime may be due to the decline in the state sponsorship of terror
and the decentralization of terror networks (O’Neil 2007). Terror and criminal networks are
covert or dark networks (Raab and Milward 2003), and therefore face a tradeoff between
secrecy and efficiency (Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007). Criminal networks are primarily
profit driven and must sacrifice secrecy for efficiency (Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007),
while terrorists put a higher premium on maintaining secrecy at the expense of efficiency
(Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007; Krebs 2002).
These observations suggest that there are significant connections between terror and
crime, and that the government should find it more difficult to detect terror activities than
criminal activities. This article analyzes the overlap among terror and criminal networks
to determine if the government can exploit these connections to more effectively identify
terrorists. The authors formulate and solve a mathematical optimization problem in which
the government allocates its scarce resources to investigate each criminal and terror network
to maximize the number of terrorists it detects. The model is illustrated with data collected
from Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006). This dataset consists of 452 terrorists from
54 domestic cases during 1971–2003. In the next section the model is described; the third
section estimates the model parameters; the fourth section presents the results; and the fifth
section is the conclusion.
Model
The model has three components: the overlapping networks, the investigation process, and
the optimization problem.
The Overlapping Networks
The model contains one terror network indexed by k = 1 and K − 1 criminal networks
indexed by k = 2, . . . , K . There are Nk nodes in network k that correspond to individuals
who take part in terrorist or criminal activities, and the networks overlap because each
individual (i.e., node) belongs to a subset of the K networks. (m1, . . . , mK ) is defined to
be the membership vector of an arbitrary node, where mk = 0 if the node is not a member
of network k and mk = 1 if the node is in network k. The probability a node has a certain
membership vector is determined by a multinomial distribution that defines the overlap
among the networks.
Each node in network k has a random number nk of edges in network k, and it is
assumed that the degree distribution has finite mean and variance. If a node is in multiple
networks, then its degree in one network is independent of its degree in every other network
the node belongs to; how the model changes if this assumption is relaxed is discussed
at the end of the article. However, if two nodes are in the same network, their degrees
may be correlated (as in the data analysis in a later section). Activities on each edge in
network k occur according to a Poisson process with parameter λk , and it is assumed that
a node’s activities occur independently along each of its edges. For example, for a drug
dealer network, Nk is the number of drug dealers, nk is the random number of different
people that the dealer sells to, and λk is the number of drug deals per unit time between the
dealer and each person he sells to. In this model, the drug buyers are not included as nodes













































620 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
network. That is, in the drug dealer network one need not explicitly model the nodes (i.e.,
drug users) at the other end of the edges that emanate from a drug dealer node. In contrast,
each edge in the terror network connects two of the N1 terrorists, and activities in the terror
network are viewed as interactions between terrorists (e.g., meetings to plan an attack).
Because the model is independent of the networks’ structures other than the degree
distributions (as explained below Equation (1)), there is no need to define an algorithm to
generate specific types of networks that are appropriate for the model. Furthermore, it is
possible to analyze a broad range of network topologies in the model depending on the
application of interest. For example, the terror network could be scale-free with exponential
truncation as in Qin et al. (2005), or it could consist of many disconnected clusters that
represent terror cells.
Network Investigation
The government identifies a node in a criminal or terror network by detecting the node
taking part in one of the activities described earlier. The government identifies only the
node it is investigating and not the people the node is interacting with; this issue is discussed
at the end of the article. The government investigates each node independently; that is, if
the government investigates a node this week, it is not more likely the government will
also investigate that node’s neighbors this week. The government performs two stages of
investigation: an initial investigation of the entire set of nodes, and a secondary investigation
of the criminal nodes identified during the initial investigation that attempts to determine
if these nodes also belong to the terror network (e.g., instead of immediately apprehending
these criminals, the government tracks their future behavior).
For the initial investigation of the criminal networks, two budget allotments are con-
sidered, denoted by bk and BIk . Let bk be the amount of money that is already being
allocated to criminal network k for the purpose of investigating criminals, where b1 = 0.
From the viewpoint of the counterterrorism resource allocation problem, bk is a sunk
cost and is not a decision variable. However, bk generates criminals that can undergo
a secondary investigation if there is sufficient coordination between crime-fighting and
counterterrorism resources, as discussed further below. Let the decision variable BIk be the
additional budget (i.e., beyond bk) that is allocated to the initial investigation of network k
for the sole purpose of detecting terrorists (i.e., the government is not directly rewarded in
the optimization problem for identifying additional criminals with BIk ). It is assumed that




to investigate each of the Nk nodes in network k. Let θ Ik be a
parameter that determines how efficient the government is at detecting activities in network
k during the initial investigation. The parameter θ Ik is in units of time/$ and incorporates a
conversion factor between dollars and investigative man-hours that determines how many
man-hours are spent investigating network k, as well as the fact that the government will
detect only a fraction of the activities during its hours of active investigation (which gener-
ates a random thinning of the Poisson process). Also included in the efficiency parameter
θ Ik is the fraction of resources spent following up on false leads and investigating individ-
uals who are not terrorists or criminals. Although θ Ik implicitly accounts for false-positive
investigations, the model makes no attempt (partly due to lack of data) to understand the
tradeoff between investigative efficiency and false positives, and hence cannot control the
false-positive detection rate, as is typical in some detection problems.
Let Y Ik be the random number of nodes in network k identified during the initial













































Resource Allocation for Domestic Counterterrorism 621
activity rate in network k (E[nk]λk), the resources spent on the initial investigation of
network k (bk + BIk ), and the government’s efficiency during the initial investigation of
network k (θ Ik ). Under the assumption that the number of nodes in network k (Nk) approaches
infinity, it is shown in section 1 of the Online Appendix that each node is identified in at










To derive Equations (1), it is assumed that detection across nodes is independent and the
probability of detecting a node depends only on detecting that node interacting with one
of its neighbors, which itself is a function of the node’s degree. Because the number of
detected nodes is the sum of random variables, the expectation of which is independent
of the correlation structure of these random variables, the quantity in Equation (1) is not
impacted by degree-degree correlations; hence, there is no need to further specify the
network structure beyond the degree distributions.
The government allocates the budget BSk to the secondary investigation of network
k for k = 2, . . . , K . While in practice extensive secondary investigations are likely to be
performed in order to learn the maximum amount about each terrorist cell identified during
the initial investigation (Buckley and Rashbaum 2007), these secondary investigations of
the terror network are beyond the scope of this article; that is, the focus is on maximizing the
number of terrorist cells identified, and the analysis ignores how to optimally investigate
a terrorist cell after a terrorist in this cell has been identified. Because the initial and
secondary investigations are viewed as ongoing, the budget decisions are made in advance




to each secondary investigation of network k. The
government determines that a criminal is a terrorist during the secondary investigation if
the government detects this node participating in a terror interaction. A node in the terror
network interacts with each of its neighbors according to a Poisson process with parameter
λ1. The government detects the terror interactions during the secondary investigation with
efficiency parameter θS1 .
T Sk is defined to be the number of terrorists identified during the secondary investigation
of network k. In Equation (2), the mean of T Sk is equal to the expected number of criminals
identified in network k during the initial investigation (E[Y Ik ] from Equation (1)) times
the probability that a criminal in network k is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]) times






]). These factors in turn depend on the allocation between
the initial and secondary investigative resources (bk + BIk and BSk ), the total activity rates
(E[nk]λk), and the investigative efficiencies (θ Ik and θ
S
1 ). In section 2 of the Online Appendix,


















Because the assumptions to calculate the values in Equations (1)–(2) may break down for
large budget allocations, the mean number of nodes detected during the investigation is
capped by the actual number of nodes (Nk). Therefore, E[Y Ik ] is heareafter replaced with













































622 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
The Optimization Problem
Formulation of the Optimization Problem.. The government chooses the investigative bud-
gets BIk and B
S
k to maximize the expected number of terrorist nodes identified during the in-






























BIk ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , K, (5)
BSk ≥ 0 for k = 2, . . . , K, (6)
where E[Y 11 ] and E[T
S
k ] are given in Equations (1)–(2). By Equations (1)–(3), the only
knowledge of the network structure required by the government to solve this optimization
problem is the degree distribution of the terror network (n1), the mean degree of each
criminal network (E[nk] for k = 2, . . . , K), the number of nodes in each network (Nk), and
the probability that a criminal is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]).
Two variants of problem Equations (3)–(6) are considered that differ by the value of bk
in Equation (1). In the coordinated case, the authors set bk equal to the existing resources
used to initially investigate criminal network k. In this case, the counterterrorism resources
BSk have the ability to perform secondary investigations of all criminals identified via bk .
In the uncoordinated case, the secondary investigations do not have access to the criminals
identified via bk because of the lack of coordination between the law enforcement resources
funded by bk (e.g., local police or the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA]) and the
counterterrorism resources funded by BIk +BSk (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]).
Hence, bk = 0 in the uncoordinated case.
Solution to the Optimization Problem. The optimization problem is easier to analyze if
the decision variables (BIk , B
S
k ) are transformed into the combined budget to investigate
each network, Bk = BIk + BSk , and the fraction of this combined budget the government




. After making this transformation, the problem
decouples and one can first solve for the optimal γ ∗k in terms of Bk . The optimal fraction
of resources is written as γ ∗k (Bk) (defined in Equation (42) of the Online Appendix) to
explicitly denote its dependence on the budget allocation. After solving for γ ∗k (Bk) for each
network, the analysis next solves for the optimal resource allocation across all networks,
which is denoted by B∗k . For more details on the solution to the optimization problem, see
section 3 of the Online Appendix.
The optimal solution is expressed in terms of three intermediate quantities. The first
is P Sk (γk, Bk), which is the probability that the government will determine during the
secondary investigation that a criminal in network k is also a terrorist, given that the
criminal is a terrorist. The government’s cost-effectiveness during the initial investigation,
eIk , is the average number of nodes that the government identifies per dollar spent in the
initial investigation of network k. The final intermediate quantity is the government’s overall













































Resource Allocation for Domestic Counterterrorism 623
investigating network k. P Sk (γk, Bk), e
I
k , and ek are defined in Equations (41), (43), and
(50)–(51) of the Online Appendix, respectively.
The optimization problem simplifies considerably in the uncoordinated case where
bk = 0. Both the probability P Sk (γk, Bk) and the optimal resource allocation γ ∗k (Bk) are
independent ofBk , and therefore, these quantities are written as P Sk (γk) and γ
∗
k for the unco-
ordinated case. In this case the main output of the optimization problem is the government’s
overall cost-effectiveness ek . The optimal solution for the uncoordinated case is to allocate
the entire budget B to the network where the government is most effective at identifying
terrorists (i.e., the network with the largest ek). The value of ek for criminal networks is
defined in Equation (51) of the Online Appendix and is the product of four factors: the
government’s cost-effectiveness during the initial investigation (eIk ), the probability that
a criminal is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]), the fraction of the budget allocated to the
initial investigation (γ ∗k ), and the likelihood of detecting a criminal as a terrorist in the




This section estimates the model parameters. By Equations (1)–(3), the parameters in
the optimization problem that need to be estimated are the probability that a criminal in
network k is a terrorist (P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1]), the number of nodes in network k (Nk), the
mean degree of network k (E[nk]), the activity rate over each edge in network k (λk), the
efficiency parameter of network k for the initial investigation (θ Ik ), the fixed law enforcement
resources allocated to the initial investigation of network k in the coordinated case (bk),
the efficiency parameter of the terror network for the secondary investigation (θS1 ), and the
degree distribution of the terror network (n1).
The authors do not directly estimate the probabilities P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1], but instead
use Bayes’s theorem:




Hence, P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1] is indirectly estimated by estimating the probability P[mk =
1 | m1 = 1] that a terrorist is a criminal. In addition, P[m1=1]P[mk=1] is estimated by comparing
the relative sizes of the networks (i.e., P[m1 = 1] is estimated by the number of terrorists
in the terrorist network, N1, and P[mk = 1] is estimated by the number of criminals in
network k, Nk). However, the estimate for the number of terrorists (N1) is particularly
crude. Furthermore, the parameters θ Ik , E[nk], and λk appear in the optimal solution only as
the aggregate quantity θ Ik E[nk]λk , which can be interpreted as the number of criminals or
terrorists detected per initial investigative dollar spent in network k. Therefore, the product
θ Ik E[nk]λk is estimated rather than the individual factors.
The estimated parameter values all appear in Table 1 except for n1, which is given by
the empirical distribution appearing in Figure 1.
The main data source is a report entitled Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents
(Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts 2006) and is described in the next section. The terror
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Figure 1. Empirical degree distribution for the terror population in Tables 2 and 3.
Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents
The Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents report is partially derived from the Amer-
ican Terrorism Study (ATS) (Smith and Damphousse 2002), which is the primary database
for existing empirical studies on the connections between crime and terror (Smith, Damp-
housse, and Roberts 2006; Smith et al. 2008; Hamm 2005). The ATS collects information
on individuals indicted as a result of “domestic security/terrorism investigations” (Smith
and Damphousse 2002). Indictments and other court documents also provide the detailed
information necessary for the empirical study: which terrorists interact with each other,
how frequently they interact, and what criminal activities each terrorist is involved with.
The analysis uses the population of terrorists in the 60 cases analyzed in Smith,
Damphousse, and Roberts (2006), which focuses on the activities (both legal and illegal)
terrorists are involved with prior to an attack. Court documents associated with the 60 terror
cases in Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006) were available through the Terrorism
Knowledge Base (TKB) (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 2008), but
unfortunately as of March 2008 the TKB is no longer available. The TKB was created and
sponsored by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and has transferred
to the University of Maryland’s Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
However, it is uncertain if and when the court documents from the TKB will be available
through START (University of Maryland 2008; Straw 2008). The authors did not gain access
to court documents for every case in Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006) because either
the TKB did not have court documents associated with a given case (seventeen cases) or the
authors were unable to download the court documents before the TKB became unavailable













































626 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
to appeal to other sources (including the descriptions in Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts
2006).
Each case focuses primarily on one individual or group and a particular incident or
string of incidents associated with that group. The 60 cases were aggregated into 54 cases
by merging several cases from Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006) when the same
terrorists were associated with multiple cases. These 54 cases occur in the United States
between 1971–2003 and—according to the classification scheme used by Smith, Damp-
housse, and Roberts (2006) and the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2002b)—contain
26 right-wing cases, 6 left-wing cases, 14 single-issue cases, and 8 international cases.
Table 2 (for the 26 right-wing cases) and Table 3 (for the 28 cases from the remaining
three categories) provide a list of the terror cases from Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts
(2006) included in the analysis, information about each case—including the number of
terrorist interactions that occur prior to an attack and the number of edges (connecting
terrorist nodes) upon which these interactions occur—and sources for this information.
The authors identified 452 terrorists in these 54 cases, and present data on the number of
terrorists in each of the four categories in Table 4.
Results presented later are derived from all 54 terror cases. However, in section 4.1
of the Online Appendix each of the four terror categories are analyzed separately (these
results are discussed in a later section). The right-wing cases involve individuals associated
with Aryan groups, the Ku Klux Klan, or anti-government groups (Smith, Damphousse,
and Roberts 2006). The Oklahoma City Bombing is the most well-known and devastating
example. The left-wing cases include leftist student groups, all-Black groups, and Puerto
Rican independence movement groups (Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts 2006). There has
been limited activity from these groups since the mid-1980s. The single-issue cases focus
either on anti-abortion acts or environmental groups associated with the Earth Liberation
Front or the Animal Liberation front. The international cases involve foreign individuals
plotting an attack in the United States or collecting money or other goods to send to terrorist
groups abroad (such as Hezbollah or the Irish Republican Army [IRA]). The first World
Trade Center attack in 1993 is one of the eight international cases, but the 11 September
2001 attacks are not included.
Terror Network
The authors construct a terror network of the 452 individuals involved in the cases in
Tables 2 and 3. In the next section what fraction of these 452 individuals are involved in
various crimes is determined to estimate P[mk = 1 | m1 = 1], which also guides the choice
for the criminal types to include in the analysis. In subsequent sections the constructed
terror network is used to estimate the interaction rate λ1 and the distribution of the degree
n1, respectively. Other data sources are used (i.e., not based on the terror population in
Tables 2 and 3) to estimate the size of the terror network N1 (which is proportional to
P[m1 = 1]) and the efficiency parameters θ I1 and θS1 .
Overlap Distribution. Table 5 presents the relevant part of the overlap distribution, which
is P[mk = 1 | m1 = 1]. The values in Table 5 are the fraction of terrorists in the data set
that are involved with each criminal activity; 98 percent of the criminal connections are
included in this table, which represent all but the rarest of overlap criminal activities. It is
determined which criminal networks each terrorist is a member of by going through the
sources listed in Tables 2 and 3. Four of the criminal networks in Table 5 are divided into






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































632 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
Table 4
Number of terrorists in each case, in total and by terror category
Mean number Median number Standard deviation
Number of Number of of terrorists of terrorists of terrorists
cases terrorists per case per case per case
Total 54 452 8.37 5 8.76
Right-wing 26 190 7.31 5 9.59
Left-wing 6 108 18 20 7.35
Single-issue 14 60 4.29 3 3.15
International 8 94 11.75 10.5 8.12
Table 5
Fraction of terrorists involved with other criminal activities, P[mk = 1| m1 = 1]
Total Right-wing Left-wing Single-issue International
Explosives, total 0.451 0.558 0.398 0.150 0.489
Explosives, users 0.425 0.542 0.398 0.150 0.394
Explosives, retail
distributors
0.022 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.085
Explosives, wholesale
distributors
0.004 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.011
Firearms, total 0.414 0.563 0.398 0.083 0.340
Firearms, users 0.350 0.489 0.389 0.083 0.191
Firearms, retail
distributors
0.046 0.074 0.009 0.000 0.064
Firearms, wholesale
distributors
0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085
Bank Robbery 0.217 0.242 0.482 0.000 0.000
False Documents, total 0.177 0.121 0.259 0.100 0.245
False Documents, users 0.155 0.095 0.250 0.100 0.202
False Documents,
distributors
0.022 0.026 0.009 0.000 0.043
Violent Acts 0.091 0.089 0.176 0.017 0.043
Drugs, total 0.053 0.011 0.074 0.050 0.117
Drugs, users 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.017 0.011
Drugs, retail distributors 0.029 0.000 0.056 0.033 0.053
Drugs, wholesale
distributors
0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053
Fraud 0.051 0.042 0.009 0.017 0.138
Counterfeit Money 0.035 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000
Immigration Violations 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160
Illegal Smuggling 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.128
Money Laundering 0.027 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.096
Arson 0.020 0.016 0.056 0.000 0.000
Extortion 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053
Kidnapping 0.007 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000













































Resource Allocation for Domestic Counterterrorism 633
three of the networks the authors distinguish between “retail distributors” and “wholesale
distributors,” where retail distributors deal in smaller quantities, primarily to users, and
wholesale distributors deal in larger quantities, primarily to other distributors. While it is
possible to refine the model to account for these levels explicitly (see Atkinson 2009),
for the purposes of this article, the separate levels of a criminal network are equivalent to
different criminal networks.
Because of the effort involved in estimating the parameters for each criminal network,
coupled with the fact that the overlap probabilities are small (e.g., < 10 percent) for most
of the criminal networks in Table 5, the analysis is restricted to six criminal networks:
explosives, illegal firearms distributor, illegal firearms user, bank robbery, false documents
distributor, and false documents user.
Interaction Rate. For the terror cases in Tables 2 and 3, the authors tabulate how many
terror interactions or activities the nodes associated with each case participate in. These
interactions might be meetings to plan the logistics of an attack or discuss a group’s radical
ideology, or some other preparatory event. If there is a meeting of several individuals then
it is assumed that each individual takes part in only one interaction (the meeting); however,
that one interaction is assumed to occur between that individual and every other participant
at the meeting, and therefore there can be fractional interactions between neighbors. The
primary sources used to tabulate these interactions are affidavits, transcripts, indictments,
and other court documents.
To compute the interaction rate λ1 one needs the total number of interactions within
the terror network, the number of edges in the network (upon which these interactions
occur), and the time period when the interactions take place. With these three pieces of
information, the interaction rate is λ1 = interactionsedges×time . If interactionsj is defined to be the
number of interactions associated with terror case j and edgesj to be the number of edges
associated with terror case j , and t = 32.5 years is set to be the length of the time period








The values of interactionsj and edgesj for each of the 54 cases appear in Tables 2 and 3, where
each interaction between neighbors is counted only once when tabulating interactionsj. The
interaction rate is λ1 = 5.5 × 10−2/year (Table 6).
This estimate assumes that the terror network is static over the period between
1971–2003, while in reality these terrorists are only active for a short period of time.
Table 6
Average annual interactions per edge in the terror network, λ1
Interaction rate
Total 5.47 × 10−2
Right-wing 3.56 × 10−2
Left-wing 7.73 × 10−2
Single-issue 9.32 × 10−2













































634 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
Therefore, the interaction rate for active terrorists will be greater than the estimate given by
Equation (8). However, λ1 appears in the optimization problem only in the product λ1θ I1 or
λ1θ
S
1 (see Equations (1), (2), and (3)). A later section estimates θ
I
1 as a function of λ1 (see
Equation (9)), and thus the product λ1θ I1 is determined by Equation (9). One could absorb
λ1 into θ I1 and still compute θ
S
1 as is done in a later section, and therefore the estimate of
λ1 is not crucial for this analysis.
Degree Distribution. Two nodes are defined as neighbors in the terror network if it is
determined that they interact in a terror activity (i.e., their interactions when tabulating
interactionsj are counted in the preceding section). For meetings involving several indi-
viduals, it is assumed that every participant of the meeting is a neighbor with every other
participant. The empirical degree distribution is illustrated in Figure 1 and the mean de-
gree is E[n1] = 5.1 (Table 7). This empirical distribution is used to compute the moment
generating term, E[etn1 ], appearing in Equation (2).
It is not expected that the authors’ network will have the same properties (e.g., small-
world or scale-free) as the criminal and terror networks in Xu and Chen (2008) because
the authors’ network consists of 54 disconnected and relatively small cells. Using the
methods described in Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009), it is found that a power law
distribution is a poor fit to the degree distribution of the network, as are Poisson and
discretized log-normal distributions. The geometric distribution does not fit the data well,
but it cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level. The terror network has a high degree correlation
among neighboring nodes, which is consistent with the Global Salafi Jihad terror network
analyzed in Xu and Chen (2008) and many other social networks (Newman 2002). The
assortativity coefficient (defined in Equation (4) of Newman (2002) and equivalent to the
Pearson correlation coefficient) for the authors’ network is 0.473.
Size of Terror Network. Several sources report that there have been on the order of 100
terror incidents in the United States over the last decade (see Lawson Terrorism Information
Center 2008; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2008c; Jarboe 2002; Blejwas, Griggs, and
Potok 2005). These incidents primarily involve environmental or right-wing terrorists. As
an order-of-magnitude estimate, it is assumed that there are 1,000 domestic terrorists. It
is further assumed that there is an equal number of international terrorists in the United
States, which is not inconsistent with a report that states a “very small fraction” of the over
200,000 individuals on an international terrorist list are in the United States (Washington
Post 2006). Therefore it is assumed that there are N1 = 2000 nodes in the terror network.
Table 7
Characteristics of the degree distribution of the terror network, n1
Mean Median Standard deviation
degree degree of degree
Total 5.09 4 4.91
Right-wing 5.59 4 5.36
Left-wing 5.85 4 5.62
Single-issue 2.53 2 2.28
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Efficiency Parameters. The efficiency parameters, θ I1 and θ
S
1 , are aggregate parameters that
account for several different factors, and therefore are difficult to directly estimate. The
authors’ approach is to indirectly estimate θ I1 using Equation (1) and then estimate the ratio
θ I1
θS1
. There is an estimate of E[n1] and an estimate of λ1 from previous sections. If one also
estimates the resources spent on an initial investigation of the terror network, B̂I1 , and the
number of terrorists identified during that initial investigation, Ŷ I1 , then one can estimate







where it is assumed that the estimate Ŷ I1 is a reasonable approximation to E[Y
I
1 ] in Equation
(1). B̂I1 and Ŷ
I
1 are now estimated. B̂
I
1 = $1.4B, which is the FBI domestic counterterrorism
budget for 2005 (Harlow 2006). The FBI investigated 248 suspects in 2005 for offenses
related to terrorist activity (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005) (using the category “Suspects
in Investigations Initiated” from Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005, which is also used
in the next section). In addition, out of 1,067 individuals referred to federal prosecutors
and classified as “international terrorists” during 2001–2006, only 372 had a lead charge
directly related to terrorism (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 2007). The
authors therefore multiply 248 by 1067372 to estimate the number of terrorists identified by the
FBI in 2005. Rounding down this product, Ŷ
I
1 = 700 is set. Substituting these estimates
into the right side of Equation (9) yields θ I1 = 1.79 × 10−6.





is estimated by the fraction of preliminary investigations that lead to legitimate
terror investigations. One report states that of nearly 10,000 terrorism investigations in 2000,
only about 500 individuals were charged, which leads to an estimate of 0.05 (Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse 2003). A Department of Justice report states that between
2004 and 2007 there were 108,000 terrorism-related threats, but only 600 terrorism-related
investigations, which leads to an estimate of 0.006 (Office of the Inspector General 2008).
This same report later states that in 2006 there were 219,000 terrorism tips by the public to
the FBI, and this resulted in 2,800 terror threats entered into its system, yielding an estimate
of 0.01 (Office of the Inspector General 2008). The analysis uses the median of these three
estimates and sets θS1 = 100θ I1 = 1.79 × 10−4, although it varies θS1 in section 4.2 in
the Online Appendix because there is uncertainty about its relationship to θ I1 (these results
are discussed in a later section).
Criminal Networks
The four subsubsections in this subsection are devoted to estimating the parameters for the
four types of criminal networks with the greatest overlap with the terror network: explosives,
illegal firearms (distributor and user), bank robbery, and false documents (distributor and
user) (although there are six criminal networks, it is easier to present the parameter estimates
for the two illegal firearms networks together and for the two false documents networks
together). By Equations (1) and (2), one needs to estimate the size of network k, Nk ,
which is proportional to P[mk = 1], and the aggregate quantity θ Ik E[nk]λk . Using the same













































636 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
initial investigation of network k, B̂Ik , and the number of nodes identified during that initial
investigation, Ŷ Ik , then the aggregate quantity can be estimated via Equation (1):








For each criminal network the analysis focuses on one agency that investigates that crime
and estimate the resources the agency spent to investigate that criminal network, B̂Ik , and the
number of nodes the agency identified during its investigations, Ŷ Ik ; for consistency, the year
2005 is used for these calculations whenever possible. In addition, for the criminal networks
the estimates for B̂Ik are also used for bk in the coordinated version of the optimization
problem.
Explosives Network. Out of 452 terrorists in the study, 192 use explosives, 10 are retail
distributors, and 2 are wholesale distributors (Table 5). However, because of a lack of data
for Nk , B̂Ik , and Ŷ
I
k for these three levels, the analysis does not distinguish between different
levels of the explosives network and only considers the aggregate explosives network.
Network size. There were 3,693 explosives investigations by the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) in 2005 (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms 2005), which is a similar value to the number of reported explosives incidents per
year between 2004 and 2006 (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 2006). These val-
ues are approximately 50 percent more than the reported number of bombing incidents per
year in the 1990s (Pastore and Maguire 2003; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1996b).
There were 369 defendants in 218 explosives-related cases in 1997 (Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms 1997). These values are 315 and 196, respectively, for 1996 (Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 1997) and 409 and 244, respectively, for 1995 (Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 1996a), implying that there were ≈ 1.66 defendants per
case during these years. If it is assumed that there were 1.66 people per bombing incident
in 2005, then the total population in the explosives network would be approximately 6,000
individuals. Although many criminals are repeat offenders that commit several crimes per
year (Blumstein et al. 1986), the authors could not find any information to estimate how
many explosives incidents each criminal is involved with, and therefore it is assumed that
there are Nk = 6, 000 nodes in the explosives network.
Budget. The authors set B̂Ik = bk = $119M, which is the amount allocated by the ATF
to explosives enforcement in 2005 (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 2005).
Number of nodes identified during the investigation. Ŷ Ik = 228 for the explosives
network, which is the number of suspects investigated by the ATF in 2005 for offenses
related to explosives (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005).
Illegal Firearms Network. Out of 452 terrorists, 158 use illegal firearms, 21 are retail
distributors, and 8 are wholesale distributors (Table 5). In this analysis, users and distributors
of illegal firearms are considered as being in separate networks.
Network size. There are ≈ 2M criminal firearm acquisitions per year (Pierce et al.
2004), and offenders purchase about one handgun per year (Koper and Reuter 1996).
Therefore, it is assumed that there are Nk = 2M users in the illegal firearms user network.
Approximately 30 percent of criminals obtain their firearm through a drug dealer, off the
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the population of illegal firearm distributors, and therefore 600,000 criminals obtain their
firearm from an illegal firearms distributor each year. The average gun distributor sells on
the order of 100 firearms per year (Koper and Reuter 1996), and thus it is assumed that are
Nk = 6, 000 distributors in the illegal firearms distributor network.
Budget. The 2005 ATF Report states $591 M went to firearms enforcement (Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 2005). In the ATF’s budget for 2008, $337.5 M were
allocated to firearms trafficking out of $730.1 M allocated to firearms enforcement (46.2%)
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 2007). Assuming the same percentage allocation
in 2005, B̂Ik = bk = $318M is set as the investigative budget for users of illegal firearms,
and B̂Ik = bk = $273M as the investigative budget for distributors of illegal firearms.
Number of nodes identified during the investigation. The ATF investigated 11,068
suspects in 2005 for offenses related to firearms (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005). Out of
8,353 convictions for firearm offenses in 2005, 1,448 were for trafficking offenses (Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 2005). This fraction ( 14488353 ) is assumed from the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (2005) to also hold for the values from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics (2005), and set the number of individuals identified during the investigation
of the illegal firearms network in 2005 is set to be Ŷ Ik = 9149 for users of illegal firearms
and Ŷ Ik = 1919 for distributors of illegal firearms.
Bank Robbery Network: Network size. There are on the order of 10,000 bank robberies per
year (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2006a; Weisel 2007; Federal Bureau of Investigation
2002a, 2005). A Department of Justice report on bank robberies states that in London
each apprehended bank robber is associated with an average of 2.8 bank robberies (Weisel
2007). The Bank Crime Statistics report published by the FBI in 2005 states that there
were an average of 1.2 known people associated with each bank robbery (Federal Bureau
of Investigation 2005), and the 2002 Uniform Crime Report states that 80 percent of bank
robberies are carried out by one offender and 15 percent involve two offenders (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 2002a) (and therefore the average number of offenders per robbery
is at least 1.25 according to Federal Bureau of Investigation 2002a). If it is assumed that
there are 1.3 offenders per bank robbery, 10,000 bank robberies per year, and 2.8 bank
robberies per individual, then the population of bank robbers would be 4,643. Rounding
up, it is assumed that there are Nk = 5, 000 nodes in the bank robbery network.
Budget. The FBI allocated $2.1 B in 2008 for federal criminal law enforcement, and
$1.1 B of this amount was allocated to reduce violent crime (Federal Bureau of Investigation
2008a) (robbery is considered a violent crime; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2006a).
The FBI spent $2.0 B on federal criminal law enforcement in 2005 (Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2006b). If it is assumed that the FBI allocated the same fraction of the
criminal enforcement budget to reduce violent crime in 2005 as it did in 2008 ( 1.12.1 ), then the
FBI spent $1.0 B to reduce violent crime in 2005. Unfortunately, more specific information
could not be found on the amount of resources the FBI spends investigating bank robberies.
The FBI investigates several types of activities related to violent crime including bank
robberies, murder for hire, and crimes against children (Federal Bureau of Investigation
2008a,b). The authors make the rough estimate that the FBI spends 10 percent of its budget
to reduce violent crime on bank robbery investigations. B̂Ik = bk = $100M is therefore set
as the investigative budget for the bank robbery network.
Number of nodes identified during the investigation. Ŷ Ik = 1877 for the bank robbery
network, which is the number of suspects the FBI investigated in 2005 for offenses related













































638 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
False Documents Network. Out of 452 terrorists, 70 use false documents and 10 are
distributors (Table 5). The analysis considers both a user network and a distributor network
for false documents.
The focus here is on the use of false documents to obscure or alter one’s identity.
However, there are many related criminal activities involving identity theft, fraud, forgery,
counterfeiting, and immigrations violations that are not included in this analysis. Unfor-
tunately, the definitions in reports and databases do not always clearly distinguish these
various criminal categories (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2006a; Koops and Leenes
2006). There are also many populations who use false documents (Associated Press 2006),
there are several types of false documents (Dinerstein 2002), and there are various agencies
that investigate false documents (General Accounting Office 1998). Therefore, it can be
difficult to obtain information about false documents that is relevant for the present pur-
poses (Gordon and Willox 2003). This analysis uses data from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) because those agencies
provide data that are most pertinent to the analysis.
Network size. The largest group of false document users is illegal immigrants (Asso-
ciated Press 2006). It is assumed that there are Nk = 10M users in the false documents user
network, which is roughly the illegal immigrant population in the United States in 2005
(Passel 2006).
Approximately 500,000 new illegal immigrants enter the United States every year
(Passel 2006). If it is assumed that all of these individuals need false documents and another
500,000 people already in the United States also need false documents, then there are on
the order of 1 M consumers of false documents per year. A sophisticated false documents
operation called the Castorena Family Organization sells 50–100 document sets per day
(Fitzgerald 2007) and their cells consist of 10–20 individuals (Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement 2005). Thus, a distributor would sell to ≈ 5 consumers a day or ≈ 1, 000
consumers per year, implying that there are ≈ 1, 000 false document distributors. However,
this value assumes the characteristics of one of the largest and most complex operations
is the norm. Because many distributors are involved with much smaller operations and
only serve a few clients, it is assumed that there are Nk = 5, 000 distributors in the false
documents distributor network.
Budget. The budget for the CBP in 2005 was 6.2B dollars (Department of Homeland
Security 2005a). The investigative category that is most relevant to this analysis is “Border
Security Inspections and Trade Facilitation at Points of Entry,” which has a budget of $2.72
B (Department of Homeland Security 2005a). Unfortunately, there is no more information
regarding how much of these resources are spent investigating users of false documents.
However, a reasonable amount of the effort at ports of entry is analyzing documents to
ensure that the people who enter the United States are who they claim to be and are entering
for legitimate purposes. Therefore, the authors roughly estimate that B̂Ik = bk = $500M
for users of false documents.
The 2007 ICE budget was $4.7 B, and $1.3 B of that went to domestic investigations
(Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 2006). These investigations include visa security,
illegal arms exports, financial and smuggling violations, immigration and customs fraud,
human trafficking, identity and benefit fraud, child pornography, and sex tourism (Immi-
grations and Customs Enforcement 2006). The category “Identity and Benefit Fraud” is
most relevant to this analysis. There are eight categories that ICE investigates, and it is
assumed that roughly 10 percent of the budget is allocated to each category. It is further
assumed that ICE targets primarily distributors of false documents with these resources,













































Resource Allocation for Domestic Counterterrorism 639
Number of nodes identified during the investigation. CBP confiscated 75,000 false
documents in 2005 and apprehended 84,000 individuals trying to enter the United States
with false documents (Department of Homeland Security 2005b). Therefore, Ŷ Ik = 80k for
users of false documents. In 2007, ICE initiated 1,309 fraud investigations that targeted
document and immigration benefit fraud that supported illegal immigrants (Immigrations




This section begins with the solution to the uncoordinated case (i.e., bk = 0). These results
are presented in Table 8. Although the overall cost-effectiveness parameters ek are the most
important numerical output in Table 8, the initial focus is on the various components of
ek from Equations (50)–(51) in the Online Appendix. During the initial investigation, the
government is least effective at directly identifying nodes in the terror network (i.e., the
terror network has the smallest value of eIk in Table 8), with its effectiveness ranging from
a factor of 5 to a factor of 320 lower than those of the criminal networks. This confirms
one of the motivating factors of this work: it should be easier to detect criminals than
terrorists. Of the six criminal networks, two are very large (false documents user and illegal
firearms user), and the other four are much smaller and of nearly identical size. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the values of eIk in Table 8 correlate reasonably well with the size of the
network (i.e., nodes in larger networks are easier to detect).
The fraction of criminals who are terrorists is small for the two largest networks due
to the needle-in-a-haystack effect (Equation (7)): for example, even though 35 percent of
terrorists are illegal firearms users (Table 1), this network is very large and so the fraction of
illegal firearms users who are terrorists is very small. By Equation (7), for the four smaller
networks that are of nearly equal size, their relative value of the probability a criminal is a
terrorist is almost completely dictated by the probability a terrorist is a criminal. Overall,
the range of P[m1 = 1|mk = 1] varies by a factor of 4,800, which is much greater than the
variation in the initial effectiveness eIk .
Relative to eIk and P[m1 = 1|mk = 1], there is little variation in P Sk (γ ∗k ) in Table 8,
which is consistent with the fact that secondary investigations avoid the needle-in-the-
haystack effect. The values of γ ∗k are inversely related to e
I
k : if the government is not
effective at identifying nodes during the initial investigation, then it has to allocate more
resources to the initial investigation to compensate for this ineffectiveness.
The government’s overall cost-effectiveness at identifying terrorists (ek in Table 8)
is an order of magnitude greater for the four smaller criminal networks (explosives, il-
legal firearms distributor, bank robbery, and false documents distributor) and the terror
network than it is for the two larger criminal networks (illegal firearms user and false
documents user). Even though the government is more effective at directly identifying
nodes in the larger criminal networks (eIk ), the variation in the overlap probability (P[m1 =
1|mk = 1])) is nearly two orders of magnitude greater than the variation in eIk . There-
fore, the government’s overall cost-effectiveness is dominated by the overlap probability in
Table 8. The range of ek in Table 8 is 960, but the range for the five smaller networks is
only 12.
The government is most effective at identifying terrorists through the bank robbery
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Table 9
Numerical results for the coordinated case
Terrorists












Terror — — — 0.73 511
Explosives 1.19 × 108 0 0.69 0.01 30
Illegal Firearms User 3.18 × 108 — — 0 0
Illegal Firearms Distributor 2.73 × 108 0 0.31 0.01 13
Bank Robbery 108 0.48 0.62 0.25 270
False Documents User 5 × 108 — — 0 0
False Documents Distributor 108 — — 0 0
Note: The original budget for the initial investigations in the criminal networks is bk. The optimal
solution is given by the fraction of the budget used for the initial investigation ( γ ∗k (B
∗
k )) and the




. The last column gives the number of
terrorists identified in each network for a budget of $1.4B.
and explosives networks are similar to the bank robbery’s ek . The four smaller criminal
networks are almost identical in size, but the probability a terrorist is a distributor of illegal
firearms or false documents is much smaller than the probability a terrorist is a member of
one of the other criminal networks (Table 5). Illegal firearms and false documents are tools
that a terrorist uses to carry out his plans, and therefore terrorists are much more likely to
be users than distributors of these goods. While there is greater overlap between explosives
and terror than bank robbery and terror, the government is almost an order of magnitude
more effective at identifying bank robbers than it is individuals involved with explosives
(eIk in Table 8).
The optimal solution in the uncoordinated case uses 32 percent of the counterterrorism
budget to investigate the bank robbery network, with a 60–40-percent split between the
initial and secondary investigations. This within-network allocation for the bank robbery
network is slightly different than the γ ∗k quantity listed in Table 8 because the value in
Table 8 is only valid if the min operators in Equations (41)–(42) of the Online Appendix
return the first term. At this level of resources, every bank robber is identified in the initial
investigation, and the remaining 68 percent of the budget is devoted to the network that has
the second-highest value of ek , which is the terror network.
Turning to the coordinated solution (Table 9), the authors find that it is optimal to spend
25 percent of the counterterrorism budget investigating the bank robbery network; at this
level of resources, all bank robbers are detected in the initial investigation. Within the bank
robbery network, resources are almost evenly divided between the secondary investigations
and the additional (i.e., beyond bk) initial investigations. Nearly all of the remaining total
counterterrorism budget is used to investigate the terror network, and a small fraction (1
percent each) of the budget is also used to perform secondary investigations of illegal
firearms distributors and the explosives network.
The current $1.4 B counterterrorism budget detects 824 terrorists in the coordinated
version of the problem, with one-third of them caught via the criminal networks (one-third
of the 54 cases in Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006) were also caught via the criminal













































642 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
the detection of 748 terrorists (Table 8) (i.e., coordination leads to a 10 percent increase in
the number of detected terrorists). If the $1.4 B was restricted to being used solely in the
terror network, then 700 terrorists would be detected.
The two versions of the problem were also solved for other budget values
(Figure 2). In the uncoordinated case, the government uses its first $0.4 B to investigate
the bank robbery network and then allocates the remaining money to the terror network.
The number of detected terrorists is piecewise linear and concave in the budget, with the
slope equaling the ek value of the network receiving the marginal budget. For very small
budgets in the coordinated case, the government relies on the existing initial investigations
of criminal networks and all counterterrorism resources are allocated to the secondary
investigation of the network according to their overlap probability, P[m1 = 1|mk = 1] (in
this case, explosives, then bank robbery, then illegal firearm distributors). Eventually, the
government has enough resources to perform additional initial investigations, which are
allocated in the order of overall cost-effectiveness (bank robbery, then terror network). The
solutions to the two cases become more similar as the budget increases.
Sensitivity Analyses
Three variations of the analysis are performed in section 4 of the Online Appendix. The
terrorist population in this study is partitioned into four categories by Smith, Damphousse,
and Roberts (2006): right-wing, left-wing, single issue, and international (section 4.1 of
the Online Appendix and Tables 2 and 3). The authors estimate the terror parameters and
compute the optimal uncoordinated solution for each category, and the results (section
4.1 and Table 1 of the Online Appendix) are similar to the results in Table 8. The main
difference between Table 8 and Table 1 of the Online Appendix is that the terror network
has the largest value of ek for all four categories in Table 1 of the Online Appendix. This is
because the probability a criminal is a specific type of terrorist is smaller than the probability
of being a terrorist in general. These calculations also suggest that the present results are
quite insensitive to the degree distribution n1 of the terror network (section 4.1 of the Online
Appendix).
The authors also vary the secondary efficiency parameter θS1 , which is difficult to
estimate from data and which plays a pivotal role in whether terrorists can effectively be
identified via their criminal activities. Even after varying θS1 by two orders of magnitude in
each direction, the networks with the four smallest values of ek in Table 8 maintain their
relative rankings (Table 2 of the Online Appendix). However, for the networks with the
three largest values of ek in Table 8, there is some variation in their relative rankings.
The authors do not have enough information to estimate confidence intervals for the
ek values in Table 8. However, to illustrate how the uncertainty in the parameter values
affects ek , the authors use the standard errors for the conditional probabilities in the second
column of Table 1 and assume the other parameter values are normally distributed with
coefficients of variation equal to 0.3, and then generate one million simulated values of ek
(section 4.3 of the Online Appendix). The simulation results show that the ek rankings in
Table 8 are fairly robust for this level of parameter value uncertainty.
Although the most imprecise parameter estimate is the number of terrorists (N1), the
criminal ek‘s are linear in N1, and hence N1 has no impact in the relative rankings of
the criminal networks. However, e1 is independent of N1, and so the value of N1 does
influence the relative effectiveness of investigating criminal networks compared to directly
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Figure 2. The solution to the (a) uncoordinated and (b) coordinated versions of problem (3)–(6) for
varying budget levels. The right vertical axis measures the optimal number of terrorists identified
(. . .) and the number of terrorists identified if the entire $1.4B budget is allocated to investigating
the terror network (∗). The left vertical axis measures the fraction of the total budget B allocated to
the initial (–) and secondary (---) investigations for the terror network (no symbol), the bank robbery













































644 M. P. Atkinson and L. M. Wein
relative rankings of the networks change only if the true values of the parameters eIk and
P[m1 = 1 | mk = 1] are much different than the estimates in Table 8.
Discussion
Related Work
While there have been studies on mathematical networks of terrorist cells (see Jordan and
Horsburgh 2005; Krebs 2002; Qin et al. 2005; Rodrı́guez 2005; Ressler 2006; Gutfraind
2008; Farley 2003) and work on the connections between crime and terror in the political
science, sociology, and criminology fields (e.g., Hamm 2005; Dishman 2005; Hutchinson
and O’Malley 2007) including several empirical studies (Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts
2006; Hamm 2005; Smith et al. 2008; Smith and Damphousse 2002), the authors are not
aware of any mathematical network studies of the crime–terror nexus. Their overlapping
networks model has some similarities to several existing models, but the orientation is
much different; for example, while the authors’ focus is on explicitly optimizing centralized
network interdiction, the goals in Palla et al. (2005) and Watts, Dodds, and Newman (2002),
respectively, are to uncover the overlapping network structure and to perform efficient
decentralized search in an overlapping network model.
In addition, the problem considered in the article is loosely related to two other problems
that are concerned with hidden populations: capture-recapture models and contact-tracing
models. While the authors are concerned with maximizing the number of individuals
identified in a hidden population, capture-recapture models are used to estimate the size of
a hidden population by repeatedly sampling the population (e.g., wildlife populations) with
replacement and comparing the number of new captures with repeat captures at each sample
(Nichols 1992); this approach may not be useful in estimating the size of the networks in
the model because captured terrorists and criminals are not likely to be released. Contact
tracing is used to reduce disease transmission by determining who an infected person has
had contact with. Contact tracing models (see Müller, Kretzschmar and Dietz 2000; Kaplan,
Craft, and Wein 2003) have the added complication of being embedded in a dynamic disease
transmission model (although these do not employ overlapping networks), whereas in the
present model the tracing (i.e., interdiction) is the ultimate objective.
Results
The main goal of this investigation is to determine the characteristics of a criminal network
that would allow the government to effectively exploit its terror connections. In particular,
the data caveats discussed below (including the fact that much of the data in the countert-
errorism field is classified) precludes the analysis from making specific recommendations
for how the government should allocate its domestic counterterrorism resources. However,
the authors have developed a new mathematical framework for thinking about these issues
and the empirical results suggest that the possibility of more effectively catching terrorists
via their precursor criminal activities is worthy of serious consideration. Nonetheless, due
to the secretive nature of this problem domain, it is left to government counterterrorism
analysts to assess this study’s usefulness.
Turning to the generic results, the key output of the model in the uncoordinated case is
ek , which is the number of terrorists detected per investigative dollar. Examination of this
quantity in Equation (51) of the Online Appendix reveals that the cost-effectiveness of iden-
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of identifying criminals during the initial investigation, the probability that a criminal is
a terrorist, and the effectiveness of the secondary investigation. However, the empirical
analysis suggests that the cost-effectiveness is dominated by the probability that a criminal
is a terrorist, and to a lesser extent by the effectiveness of the initial investigation (because
in Table 8 the variation in P[m1 = 1|mk = 1] is 1–2 orders of magnitude greater than the






k )), and that both
of these factors are partly determined by the size of the criminal network, with smaller crim-
inal networks generating greater effectiveness. This suggests that the government should
focus on identifying crimes that are relatively obscure, somewhat easy to detect, and have
appeal to terrorists. In the empirical study, the bank robbery network ranks highest because
it possesses all three characteristics, while explosives ranks next highest among criminal
network because it possesses two of the three characteristics (it is not as easy to detect as
bank robberies). In contrast, while terrorists are reasonably likely to use illegal firearms
and false documents in the empirical study, these networks are too large to exploit in a
cost-effective manner.
When the counterterrorism resources are allowed to piggyback on the existing crime-
fighting resources, the government increases the number of terrorists detected by 10 percent
relative to the uncoordinated case. For realistic budget values, the overall effectiveness ek
again dictates which networks to investigate, although in this coordinated case a lower
fraction (48 percent vs. 60 percent) of the bank robbery budget is allocated to the initial
investigation. In practice, the degree of coordination has improved in the last decade (O’Neil
2007), but there is still often more conflict than cooperation among different parts of the
government (Stockton 2009), and neither of the extreme cases (full coordination and no
coordination) is realistic. Several issues would need to be addressed before the government
could implement a fully coordinated criminal and counterterrorism program. A high degree
of cooperation and communication among state, local, and federal authorities (O’Neil
2007), as well as among the various federal agencies, would be required. An assessment
would be needed as to how the core focus and duties of police and other governmental
agencies may suffer if their role is expanded to be part of a larger counterterrorism effort
(Stockton 2009).
Data Caveats
The primary reason why this empirical study cannot directly inform current counterter-
rorism policy is that the terror population from Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006)
is vastly different than the current relevant terror population. The terror population in this
study is from 1971–2003 and includes several categories of terrorism (e.g., left-wing and
environmental) that may not be as much of a concern now or in the future as other types
of terrorism (e.g., Islamic Jihad). Indeed, the time span of the empirical data is longer than
the time scale over which these operations evolve; however, a temporal analysis (data not
shown) of the data from Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006) was not fruitful due to
the low frequency rate of terror attacks. Furthermore, the cases in Smith, Damphousse,
and Roberts (2006) may not be representative of the terrorists active between 1971–2003
for two reasons. First, there could be selection bias; for example, perhaps larger terror
cells, or terrorists of certain types (e.g., right-wing terrorists appear to be less professional
than left-wing terrorists in the present study) were easier to detect during this time period.
Second, this study selects cases for analysis based on the availability of sources, and thus
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Court documents provide a valuable source to determine which nodes interact with each
other and how frequently, but the authors were unable to gain access to court documents
for every case in the data set (see earlier section). However, even if the authors did have
court documents for each case, they are not perfect sources for the analysis. The purpose
of the court documents is not to provide a detailed account of a terrorist group, and the
interactions captured in the court documents represent only a fraction of the activity that
actually occurred. While it is tempting to view the estimates of the degree distribution n1
and the frequency λ1 in the terror network as lower bounds on the true values, this data
censoring could be offset by the selection bias mentioned earlier.
Another shortcoming of the data is that the specific information needed to estimate
the parameters in Table 1 does not always exist (or the authors could not find them). It
is assumed that the data used to estimate Ŷ Ik and B̂
I
k correspond to values from an initial
investigation, but this may not be an accurate assumption; data separated by initial versus
secondary investigation would be helpful. Furthermore, it is assumed that all authorities
(state, local, and federal) have the same parameters values. In reality, each agency has
its own abilities and efficiencies that determine the agency’s investigative effectiveness
for each network. Finally, several of the parameters values in Table 1 are derived from
assumptions and approximations and are not precise estimates. In particular, the size of
the terror network N1 and the parameters for users and distributors of false documents are
rough estimates (see earlier sections).
Model Extensions
One limitation of the model is that it fails to allow the terrorists to modify their participation
in criminal activities based on the government’s budget allocation. However, this failure to
model the problem in a game-theoretic framework is not as big a concern in the model as
it is in other homeland security applications where the budget allocations are more public
(e.g., homeland security budget allocations to state governments for protecting critical
infrastructure are publicly available—here there is no reason to expect the budget allocation
to be made public), and furthermore because the intelligence tracking of individual terrorists
and criminals is covert, the effort expended by government agents will be difficult to
observe. Nonetheless, one could embed the present model into a Stackelberg game (Gibbons
1992) in which the government makes budget allocation decisions and then the terrorists
observe information about this allocation and decide which precursor criminal activities to
participate in. A challenge with this model extension is to determine the terrorists’ objective
function, which would require data that might be difficult to obtain even in the classified
arena.
In such a formulation, the terrorists may require certain types of assets (a weapon, some
money, identification documents), and the terrorists may have several legal and illegal ways
of obtaining each type of asset. An optimal budget allocation would equalize the net benefit
(e.g., the likelihood of success, perhaps minus the cost, if this varies widely across options)
of each option to the terrorist. Consequently, a game-theoretic formulation would cause the
government to focus more on criminal activities for which few viable options exist (e.g.,
false documents, money laundering, explosives) and less in, for example, money-making
activities (e.g., drug dealing) for which safer options exist (note that in the data set used
from Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts 2006, the bank robberies come from a handful of
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A more realistic game would include multiple time periods and would allow terrorists
to update their estimates of the government’s resource allocations indirectly only via the
apprehension of associated terrorists (this local information may not be a reliable signal
about the global resource allocation). Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of a dynamic
model would be to examine how the government could influence the terrorists’ beliefs
about the government’s resource allocation (e.g., by spreading false information about
counterterrorism operations) so that the terrorists update their parameters in a manner that
is beneficial to the government.
It is assumed that if a node belongs to multiple networks, its degree in one network is
independent of its degrees in all other networks. Consequently, the last term in Equation (2)
is an expectation with respect to the terror network degree distribution P[n1 = r]. If there
are correlations between a node’s degree in the terror network and its degree in network k,
then the last term in Equation (2) would be computed with respect to the degree distribution
defined by P[n1 = r] E[nk | n1=r]E[nk ] (the steps to show this are similar to the analysis in section 2
of the Online Appendix). If this conditional degree distribution is known, then the last term
in Equation (2) can be appropriately modified, but the ensuing analysis will remain the same.
In this model, the government identifies only the node it is directly investigating
during the initial investigation and not the neighbors that the node is interacting with. In
practice, the government may sometimes also identify the neighbor when it detects an
interaction. Asymptotically, the government will detect a node taking part in at most one
interaction during the initial investigation (the steps to show this are similar to the analysis in
section 1 of the Online Appendix). Therefore, the number of criminals and terrorists
identified during the initial investigation would be multiplied by two if the neighbor is also
identified during an interaction.
On a related note, during the secondary investigations in the present model, the govern-
ment could determine not only other networks that nodes belong to, but also neighbors of
nodes. The model could, in theory, allow the government to walk through the network in this
way, identifying neighbors-of-neighbors-of-neighbors . . . of a node originally detected in
the initial investigation (akin to tracing contacts-of-contacts in section 4.2 of Kaplan, Craft,
and Wein 2003). However, this would greatly complicate the analysis (e.g., accounting for
clustering and degree correlations within the networks) and require much more data about
the overlap distribution and would lead to strategies that consume an unrealistically high
level of detection resources.
In the present model, the government cannot identify isolated nodes in a network;
hence, an isolated terrorist node could never be apprehended as a terrorist, even if he
was detected participating in criminal networks. To partially address this shortcoming, one
could add nonhuman nodes to the terror network that represent the target (e.g., so that the
interaction is surveillance of the target).
Another shortcoming of the present model is the assumption that the number of iden-
tified nodes is linear in the budget. This relationship would be concave for large budgets
due to decreasing marginal returns, and could be convex for very small budgets due to
economies of scale. While a smoother nonlinear relationship than the capping by Nk used
in Equation (3) would change the quantitative solution to the optimization problem, it would
not affect the model’s basic qualitative behavior.
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